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American Studies analyzes a society in which more than half of the 
people attend church regularly. Political speeches invoke God's blessings; 
celebrities attribute their success to divine help; and popular musicians 
routinely use words like heaven, sin, and prayer. Pat Robertson owns the 
fifth-largest television network, is a major force in the Republican Party, 
and has seriously claimed that George Bush was complicit in a Satanic 
conspiracy to institute "an occult-inspired world socialist dictatorship."1 
Two of the greatest leaders of the postwar African-American freedom 
movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, were ministers. 
Thirty-two percent of citizens say that they are "born-again"; 62 percent 
have "no doubt" that Jesus will return; and 85 percent accept the Bible as 
divinely inspired.2 How high do these numbers have to rise before our 
field treats popular religion as an integral part of United States popular 
culture? As a scholar trained in both United States religion and American 
Studies, I have long been dismayed by the existential and methodological 
gulfs between these two fields. Religion, especially contemporary religion, 
is among the most understudied topics in American Studies, compared to 
its weight in the larger culture.3 Meanwhile, despite some important ex-
ceptions, academic specialists in religion often lag behind the leading 
voices in the interdisciplinary study of cultural pluralism, popular culture, 
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and cultural theory. I believe that bridging these gaps should be a high 
priority. 
R. Laurence Moore's Selling God and Roger Finke and Rodney 
Stark's Churching of America help address this challenge. They approach 
religions in the same terms as other traditions and subcultures, without the 
special pleading based on confessionalism or revelation that sometimes 
bogs down discussions in religion, enraging secular scholars. They frame 
their questions within wider debates in sociology and cultural history. 
Both start from the premise that religious disestablishment created a free 
market in culture, wherein successful religions were forced to compete in 
persuasiveness—in effect, to undersell both other religions and secular 
commercial amusements in a cultural marketplace. By analyzing the 
market offerings of religious leaders, they shed light on the growth and 
continuing strength of religious institutions and identities at the grassroots. 
From this promising starting point, Finke and Stark take us two steps 
forward and two steps back. Moore, however, takes us two solid steps 
forward with no serious missteps. This still leaves the conversation lag-
ging slightly behind the most interesting work in cultural studies, but in a 
far stronger position to move forward. 
Since both these books are studies of popular religion, I begin by 
distinguishing four ways that scholars in religion understand the word 
"popular": 
(1) They sometimes mean practices that many ordinary 
people enjoy doing, such as attending church ser-
vices as opposed to writing academic theology. 
(2) They sometimes mean "authentic" or "folk" prac-
tices—e.g. premodern hymns or traditional ethnic 
devotional practices, as opposed to contemporary 
commercial culture. 
(3) In contrast to sense two, they sometimes mean 
religious ideas circulated through commercial mass 
media—for example, prayers spoken on TV by 
famous basketball players, as opposed to private 
face-to-face prayers in their churches or locker 
rooms. (Televangelism is one example, but is less 
important than religious issues within "mainstream" 
programming.) 
(4) They sometimes use "popular religion" to describe 
religious dimensions of counter-hegemonic cultural 
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contestation by nonelites versus élites. Religion in 
this last sense could be "popular" even if practiced 
by a persecuted minority, and whether or not it is 
mass-mediated. The definition of such "popular 
religion" shifts with different definitions of "the 
hegemonic"; however, the political use of hymns 
by African American churches during the civil 
rights movement is one example. 
These four senses interrelate. We might argue that no religion can be 
popular in sense one (widely practiced) unless it is popular in sense three 
(mass mediated) and unpopular in sense four (hegemonic). Or we could 
argue that it cannot be popular in sense four (counter-hegemonic) unless it 
is popular in sense two and unpopular in sense three (a folk practice 
uncorrupted by commodification). There are many possibilities—but using 
the term "popular religion" to cover all these meanings at the same time 
is not among them. One of my goals in this essay is to explore whether 
the last two kinds of popular religion—mass-mediated and counter-
hegemonic—might sometimes overlap. Of course they do not always 
overlap, and when they do they may not be popular in sense one. How-
ever, asking how they fit together (or stand in conflict) is interesting for 
two reasons: it is a relatively understudied topic and it is a promising 
place for dialogue between religious studies and cultural studies. 
Finke and Stark mainly study popular religion in sense one, the demo-
graphically prevalent. They argue a point well-known by historians in 
United States religion, that the long-term trajectory of United States reli-
gious participation has been upward. Pat Robertson is misinformed when 
he laments, as are secularists when they celebrate, a decline in religious 
commitment since the days of "old time religion." The actual percentage 
of religious membership increased from 15-20 percent in the colonial era 
to around 60 percent in recent years. 
Finke and Stark's first step forward is in quantifying these demograph-
ics. They estimate church members from the number of seats in existing 
churches, testing their projections against census reports by clergy—reports 
that have been hard to standardize or use by themselves because they use 
variable definitions of membership and are sometimes distorted. (One 
article on colonial Anglicans based on clerical reports to a bishop in 
London estimated six times as many church members as available seats in 
their buildings.) Finke and Stark present their findings effectively, using 
graphs and photos. Most often they document commonplaces such as the 
low numbers of colonial church members, strong Baptist and Methodist 
growth in the 1800s, and the greater success of evangelicals compared to 
129 
liberal Protestants in the twentieth century. Sometimes they make fresh 
revisions in received wisdom. For example, standard texts have claimed 
that Roman Catholics became the nation's largest denomination by 1850. 
Finke and Stark revise their numbers, first, by subtracting people from 
"Catholic countries" like Ireland whom they judge "nominal" or who were 
actually members of a Protestant minority and, second, by counting Prot-
estant and Catholic children using the same system (e.g., not ignoring 
Baptist children before they become baptized members, while counting 
Catholic children who were baptized as infants.) This reduces the estimate 
of active Catholics from 3.5 to 1.1 million and means that Catholics did 
not actually outgrow Methodists until 1890. Moreover, inflated estimates 
caused Catholic leaders to worry about "defecting" people who never 
should have been counted in the first place. Finke and Stark's data also 
show that Catholics were not necessarily concentrated in eastern cities like 
Boston; in 1860 the largest percentages were in Rhode Island, California, 
Louisiana, and Minnesota. 
Finke and Stark undermine this solid step forward by failing to engage 
the existing historical literature at its strongest. "We did not intend to 
make major revisions in the history of American religion," they say, but 
"we have done precisely that" (1). Unfortunately, it turns out that they 
revise only "general historians of American religion" (2), ignoring several 
of the more pluralistic and/or demographically sophisticated surveys and 
dozens of specialized studies, including an explicit historical critique of 
Stark.4 Finke and Stark accuse general historians of overstressing top-
down interpretations of mainline Protestants, a common complaint for two 
decades. One feels sorry for them when they claim to pioneer the ideas 
that pluralism created conditions for religious growth, or that Baptist, 
Holiness, and Pentecostal groups grew faster than the old mainline. This 
has been old hat for a long time, and any lingering doubt that the field 
has emphasized it was dispelled, at the very latest, by Moore's 1986 
Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans.5 
The ideas Finke and Stark attack do retain some influence in history, 
in popular Christian literature, and (the unacknowledged key to their argu-
ment?) among sociologists committed to secularization theory. In these 
contexts their book is valuable. Indeed, their belated sense of mission 
gives their writing an appealing verve and energy. For instance, both 
books under review discuss how radio and television networks provided 
free air time to the Federal Council of Churches (FCC), then withdrew the 
privilege in 1960—after which evangelical broadcasters swept the field 
since they had already learned to pay their own way. While Moore 
blandly reports that the FCC "acted as a media trade-association group" 
(246) and lingers over the ironies of its position, Finke and Stark blast the 
FCC as a "cartel" with an unambiguous stench of hypocrisy, illusion, and 
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failure (218-223). Unfortunately, Finke and Stark's self-assurance some-
times shades into over-confidence and a tendency to make unwarranted 
assumptions about the power of selected anecdotes. For example, they 
speak of the "immense respect in which American Catholics held their 
priests" in earlier years, in contrast to the current situation which they 
attribute to Vatican II. I consulted their footnote supporting this claim, 
wondering first how it fits the mixed evidence in studies like Robert Orsi's 
Madonna of 115th St. and, second, whether evidence of decline would 
have been greater or smaller without Vatican II.6 Rather than addressing 
either question, they merely mention a 1944 Bing Crosby film that was so 
pro-church that it made a group of priests "too moved to speak" (295-
296). 
Church membership statistics need interpretation. Moore pointed this 
out in response to Jon Butler's Awash in a Sea of Faith, which covers 
much of the same ground as Finke and Stark. Only 17 percent of taxpay-
ers in Salem at the time of the witch trials claimed church membership, 
but "are we truly to think that Salem in 1683 was anything other than a 
Christian culture? If it wasn't, then whatever in the world ever was?" Of 
course we must understand how church membership increased among later 
generations of Anglo-Americans—but not forget that these later genera-
tions "did not have to learn Christian practices in the same way that 
African Americans had to learn those things."7 It may be that the 17 
percent figure understates the impact of religion in Salem and the 60 
percent figure overstates it for recent years. Some scholars have found 
growth in "mental members" of churches, those who show up in national 
surveys but not church records. For example, the raw numbers of people 
who claimed to be Episcopalians increased by 20 percent from the 1960s 
to 1980s, but the church records show a 25 percent decrease in active 
members.8 
When it comes to interpretation, Finke and Stark again move one step 
forward and one step back. They base their analysis on the distinction 
between churches and sects, basically reworking Dean Kelly's influential 
thesis of 1972 using business metaphors.9 Unlike churches that cast a 
wider net and have lower group boundaries, sects are smaller and more 
pugnacious, with higher boundaries. Finke and Stark argue that sects are 
more dynamic, but become complacent with age and vulnerable to compe-
tition from new sects. Finke and Stark hypothesize that rational "shop-
pers" in the religious market should invest in sects, even though churches 
sell higher prestige at cheaper prices. Since sects are more demanding, 
their members provide greater rewards for each other. But high commit-
ments must be motivated by "otherworldliness," which Finke and Stark 
define in terms of embattlement, rather than accommodation, with respect 
to the dominant culture. Sects have "a high degree of tension" with "their 
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sociocultural environment" (40, 169). Finke and Stark link this 
"otherworldliness" to belief in miracles and to clergy with low education 
and pay. Their conclusions will gratify neo-conservatives: liberal Chris-
tians are intellectual and political losers; conservatives are winners. Ap-
parently, in this land of Nixon and Reagan, conservatives move against the 
grain of the dominant culture. 
This analysis implies a notion of the "world" against which sects are 
"other." By positing this "world" Finke and Stark construct the same 
hegemonic center that they claim to deconstruct, but an even greater prob-
lem is selective definition of this "center." They present "upstart sects" as 
outsiders based on these sects' self-understood resistance to certain aspects 
of modern thought and liberal social policy. This generalization holds 
only if analysts screen out these groups' harmony with other major aspects 
of dominant culture such as the bourgeois heterosexual family, patriotic 
nationalism, consumer capitalism, individualism.10 For Finke and Stark 
such things remain in the shadows, and what shines in the light of analysis 
seems arbitrary. For example, they accent the lower social distance be-
tween uneducated laity and Methodist circuit riders, presenting this as a 
tension between Methodists and their environment; but later, they associate 
the greater distance between Catholic priests and laity before Vatican II 
with the same "tension." They stress how Catholics helped shape the 
institutional fabric of ethnic communities: perhaps this is 
"otherworldliness" and "tension with the environment," but "worldliness" 
and "constitution of the environment" makes equal sense. 
Finke and Stark's theory seems to imply that what I call popular 
religion four (counter-hegemonic) produces popular religion one (demo-
graphic success). Is this true? Do all forms of accommodation lead to 
weakness and failure? Finke and Stark concede limits to their hypothesis 
that religions succeed if they demand sacrifice. Apparently some forms of 
sacrifice really are sacrificial and some ways of challenging power lead to 
actual loss of popularity. But this would be sacrifice for losers, and it 
rarely peeks through the cracks in this book. Finke and Stark are inter-
ested in sacrifice for winners, which is more like accepting a housing code 
required to buy a house in an exclusive neighborhood. Catholic teaching 
on contraception clearly represents "tension with the environment" but 
since it alienates people, they barely mention it. They do not ask whether 
Catholic teachings against unemployment and militarism represent tension 
with the environment and an opportunity for success. 
Applied to mainline churches, Finke and Stark's theories suggest that 
prudent managers should promote stronger counter-hegemonic commit-
ments. I believe this is good advice on many issues, but would it lead to 
success across the board? Certainly this hypothesis would not have pre-
dicted the "winners and losers" in the religious competition for corporate 
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funding in recent years. Finke and Stark might advance this discussion if 
they explored what forms of "tension" produce "winners" and which forms 
produce "losers." Consider a recent study of baby boomers who were 
confirmed as Presbyterians in the 1960s. Half remain church members 
today (40 percent in mainline congregations); the other half have drifted 
into an apathetic and noncommittal stance (40 percent) or outright secular-
ism (8 percent). Only 6 percent became fundamentalists, despite the con-
ventional wisdom about gains on the right at the expense of liberals. The 
leading trend among both members and defectors was "lay liberalism," an 
open and tolerant stance, especially toward individual freedom and sexual 
morality. The more liberal the boomer, the more likely he/she is to be 
bored or alienated. Even though this study supports Finke and Stark's 
contention that boundary-maintenance is crucial, its data seems to suggest 
that stronger boundaries, especially ones based on conservative gender 
politics, would accelerate defections.11 
Unfortunately this sort of nuance is lacking in Finke and Stark's self-
assured analysis. For them, meatless Fridays signify strong boundaries, 
otherworldliness, and "winning." Seminaries that address feminism signify 
compromise with the dominant culture, secularization, and "losing." Camp 
meetings that involve reunions, courtship, and theatrical techniques—both 
books call them "mammoth picnics"—are otherworldly. So are Christian 
bookstores, beauty queens, and football players. Such selective definitions 
erase most of the value in Finke and Stark's interpretive model. Despite 
their statistical contributions, I advise readers interested in these issues to 
consult Moore's Religious Outsiders and Butler's Awash in a Sea of Faith. 
Turning to Moore's Selling God, we shift from studying popular reli-
gion in sense number one (the prevalent) to sense number three (the mass-
mediated). Much of Moore's argument is condensed in Mark Twain's 
comment of 1871: Americans "no longer got their religion from the 
'drowsy pulpit.' Christianity came 'filtered down' through plays and the 
'despised novel'" (147). If religion was to succeed in the open market 
created by disestablishment, it had to be packaged to outsell other kinds 
of religion as well as secular entertainment. Protestant clergy were aware 
of this dynamic and responded in innovative and aggressive ways. They 
made their offerings less "drowsy"—e.g., through trashy novels with reli-
gious morals, "saloon substitutes," the entertainment functions of 
Chautauquas, and religious theme parks. And they tried to shape the form 
of their secular competition—e.g., through reform of the theater, cooperat-
ing with pioneering forms of "family entertainment" like P.T. Barnum's, 
and attempting to police the morals of Hollywood. 
Moore enjoys choosing examples that tweak common wisdom. He 
compares critics of Scientology and Methodist revivalism. After describ-
ing critics who attacked revivals for their low intellectual quality, emotion-
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alism, sexual energy, and anarchy, he says "it is hard to read through these 
accounts without thinking of modern rock concerts" (49). He quotes Jim 
Bakker: "We have a better product than soap or automobiles. We have 
eternal life." Then he says that these words sound exactly like "church 
advertisement manuals sponsored by Social Gospel enthusiasts" and that 
televangelists simply "re-situate the Social Gospel on the political Right" 
(249-250). Moore also argues that religious controversies became "a kind 
of paid amusement" (120) and makes his point through amusing examples. 
Consider J.Z. Knight (Shirley MacLaine's teacher), who was ordered to 
channel for Ramtha in a divorce court to determine whether Ramtha was 
"a god, a spirit, or a fake" (262). Moore discusses numerous "true tales" 
of sex and violence, as well as real-life scandals such as that of Bishop 
Benjamin Onkerdonk, who (as reported in the Herald, a New York news-
paper) thrust his "hand of consecration" into the "bare bosom" of a parish-
ioner as they rode in a carriage driven by her husband (132). 
However, this book is far more than a set of snappy anecdotes. It is 
a major contribution to United States cultural history. Moore's baseline 
analysis is that secularism (in the form of consumer capitalism) progres-
sively defeated religion (defined with reference to transcendence and social 
criticism), and that the commercialization of Protestantism intensified this 
process. Recall Twain's "drowsy pulpit" comment—Moore concurs that 
religion was "filtered down" through the process of commercialization. He 
implies that this filtering often made religion shallow and changed the 
primary cultural arenas from the pulpit to the theater, the seminary to the 
civil court, and so on. Moore can be harsh about this. He speaks of the 
"blame-reducing effect" of explaining commercialization by the iron laws 
of the market rather than the free choice of clerics. His point "is not quite 
to say"—apparently it is nearly to say—"that the market conquered reli-
gion, forcing religion to walk the streets, to make its spiritual mission a 
cash transaction, to surrender its power" to the secular (145-146). Moore 
denies that there is a "naked public square," as neo-conservatives argue.12 
Rather the problem is that "religion is everywhere" but it "has become an 
ordinary commodity. . . Jim Bakker is Velveeta; Norman Vincent Peale is 
sliced Swiss in plastic wrap; Reinhold Niebuhr is Brie" (256). 
At the same time, Moore stresses that such popularized religion rep-
resents a sort of success. Religion did filter down and in the process it 
filled "drowsy pulpits" and influenced the "despised novels." He argues 
that this outcome was the best possible tradeoff from the perspective of 
Protestant leaders, constituting a major explanation for the prevalence of 
religion in United States culture. Moore presents his protagonists as cre-
ative innovators in United States cultural history who had important suc-
cesses in pursuing their agendas. Far from being cheesy imitations of 
secular culture (the role that "Christian rock" plays in relation to rock) 
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they were often "major inventors of American popular commercial cul-
ture," especially during the nineteenth century. (92) Their actions affected 
wider popular tastes and the larger shape of the market. "If what people 
call the spiritual is to have any worldly or public importance, it has to be 
recognizable in something tangible" in the marketplace of culture. With-
out popularization "we might not be talking about spirit at all these days" 
(145-146). Moore shows that antebellum denominations and political par-
ties developed in parallel and mutually reinforcing ways; then he notes that 
many contemporary citizens describe religion—and few describe politics— 
as central to their lives. "Those who have wanted a politics without re-
ligion may get their wish," he concludes, "but at the cost of a politics 
without parties or voters" (89). 
In the end, Moore does not present his protagonists' cup as either 
half-empty or half-full, but three-quarters empty. However, the upshot of 
his nuanced analysis, and the great contribution of the book, is to unsettle 
the assumption that religion and secular popular culture are in a zero-sum 
competition. His argument raises crucial questions about the pragmatic 
possibilities for transmitting religious traditions within capitalism. It im-
plies that we cannot understand U.S. popular culture without serious atten-
tion to religion. 
Moore's book will not be the last word on this subject. No book can 
do everything, and in this case the analysis is weighted heavily toward 
male Anglo-Protestant elites. In a revealing passage, Moore shifts in three 
sentences from discussing "religion" to "Protestants" to "religious leaders" 
(6). We need research on how these issues appear from other social loca-
tions. Also, Moore sometimes slips from a commendable focus on the 
commodified dimensions of religious activities, to the less defensible im-
pression of reducing the religious developments he discusses to the dimen-
sion of commodification. This occasional reduction does not mean that 
Moore himself believes that religion can be so reduced; in fact, the prob-
lem is more nearly the opposite. Without theorizing in depth, he some-
times seems to presuppose that "real" religion and consumer culture are 
essentially opposed, even when his examples blur their distinctions. In 
this respect the book reads less as a bold new interpretation of religion 
taking popular forms, and more as the sort of jeremiad about the 
trivialization of religion that sells for a dime a dozen. Moore does say 
that almost all religions at all times have had commercial aspects; his 
argument about the United States case concerns the rising centrality of 
commercialization. Even so, at times he converges with scholarship that 
laments the erosion of popular religion in sense two (the "authentic"). He 
is of two minds about the idea that, within a culture organized through 
pervasive commodification, religion would logically be articulated through 
such forms, so that the most interesting questions shift. The issue is no 
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longer "Commodification or not?" but rather "Why this kind of 
commodification and not that kind?" 
This leads to my final reservation. Moore does not select the stron-
gest examples of commodified religion(s) that advance the moral agendas 
he supports—agendas suggested by his respect for Reinhold Niebuhr's so-
cialism of the 1930s and his parting thought that commodification leaves 
us "with nothing new under an unforgiving sun whose burning rays carry 
cancer... through an ozone-depleted atmosphere" (276). He is too quick to 
homogenize popular religions. His treatments of the African-American 
prophetic tradition and white populism are severely truncated, his gender 
analysis is limited, and he downplays the oppositional potential of urban 
working-class religion. He does describe contestation between middle-
class and working-class forms of leisure. He portrays workers winning 
significant compromises, but he presupposes their inevitable defeat and 
suggests (citing Theodor Adorno) that they bought "the cultural equivalent 
of a mess of pottage" (200). Insofar as United States religions have 
moved inside the horizon of commodity culture, as Moore persuasively 
argues, exploring their moral-political differences is imperative. Moore is 
not fully engaged in such exploration; we need more studies of how 
struggles for social justice can take place in and through popular culture. 
It is enough for one book, however, to advance the scholarly discussion as 
much as this one does. 
At the outset I suggested four meanings of popular religion, and 
throughout this essay I have been trying to call one combination of these 
meanings into the spotlight, from a place where other meanings often 
overshadow it. This is sense four (counterhegemonic) within the horizon 
of sense three (mass-mediated). Both Finke and Stark and Moore advance 
this discussion, even though neither focuses on it. Finke and Stark illu-
minate popular religion one (the prevalent) and show that considering 
oneself counter-hegemonic can be a winning rhetoric if "opposition" makes 
minimal demands and supports bourgeois values. Moore focuses on the 
terrain where popular religion three meets popular religion one. I suggest 
further work that builds on Moore's analysis, but shifts greater attention to 
places within popular religion three where forms of popular religion four 
thrive. Then we can explore how oppositional popular religions interact 
with demographically widespread popular religions—either overlapping 
with them or contesting them in specific contexts and fields of power. 
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